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A receipt was given in the following words: "Received this day
from Ann Charlotte Gast the sum of $s for all my services rendered her
in her house up to this date; and I agree to let the legacy in her favor in
my will as now made, stand and remain for her benefit at my death."
The paper was signed and witnessed. Held,it is insufficient to establish
such a contract as can be enforced against her estate, when ir'appears
that the will in existence at the time the receipt was given has been
destroyed or revoked.
There was nothinig in the paper itself, nor in the evidence dehors the
instrument to show the legacy was promised in consideration of services
previously rendered or to be performed.
Such a contract can only be enforced, when upon a sufficient consideration, and clearly proved by direct and positive testimony, and
where its terms are definite and certain.

Opinion by STERRETT, J.
Although on its face it would
appear unreasonable that a man
should be permitted, by contract,
to limit the disposition of his property by will, a little reflection
convinces us, not only of the propriety of the rule, but that it follows logically from the view taken
by the law of all contracts, whereby
a man disposes of that which is his
own.

There can be no doubt of the
abstract proposition that a person
may enter into a valid agreemeflt
to make a will in a particular manner, or what is the same thing, not
to make any will at all. The cases

have so held from the earliest
time. In Guilmer v. Battison, i Vernon 48, decided by Lord KING, in
1682, the contract was: "If I die
without issue of my body, I will
give you either o50o, or leave you
my land." The agreement was insisted upon, and the Court decreed
that it be enforced: Jones v. Martin, 3 Amb., 882; Fenton v. Embers, 3 Burr., 1278; Fortescue v.
Hannah, 19 Vesy, 67; Johnson v.
Hubble, 5 AM. LAw REG. 177;
Rivers v. Rivers, I Dessau., 116;
Newton v. Newton, 46 Minn., 33;
Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St.,
161.

1 150 Pa. St., 143; 30 W. N. C., 439.
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The main difficulty arises in
satisfactorily proving such contracts; and when proved, in applying a satisfactory remedy. The
law has always held in abhorrance
an attempt to charge a decedent's
estate with contracts of a surpressed or private nature entered
into during his life, and courts
have always required proof of a
very positive character to support
them. This feeling is due to the
inclination which exists among
survivors, who are, perhaps, disappointed with the disposition which
the deceased has made of his property, to recover as large a share of
his estate as possible under the
guise of assumed contracts and
agreements entered into during his
life. Also to the difficulty of denying such contracts when alleged,
owing to the death of one of the
most interested parties. This disposition of the court was well expressed by Justice STRONG, in
Graham v. Graham (piost), where
he says: "The temptation to set
up claims against the estates of
decedents, particularly such decedents as have no lineal heirs, is
very great. It cannot be doubted
that many such claims have been
asserted which would never have
been known, had it been possible
for the decedent to meet his alleged creditors in a court ofjustice.
-Not infrequently we witness a
scramble for a dead man's effects,
disreputable to those engaged in
it, and shocking to the moral
sense of the community. Such
claims are always dangerous, and
when they rest on parole evidence,
they should be strictly scanned."
Covenants to make a stipulated
disposition of property by will
have long been used in England
in marriage settlements, where a
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person will covenant either to give
a certain amount by will or otherwise, or that his executors, at a
certain time after his decease, will
pay a particular 'amount to the
covenantee: Mayd v. Field, L. R.,
3 Ch. D., 587; Bold v. Hutchinson,
20 Bev., 250.

But where it is sought so to hold
a third person liable for representations made on marriage, they
must be clearly proved, and it
must appear that the marriage took
place upon the faith of them: Bold
v. Hutchinson (ante); Jamison v.
Stein, 21 Bev., 5.
In America such settlements are
not much used, and the cases upon
contracts to make a will have generally arisen under different circumstances.
The Contract.-It is most important, where relief is sought for
the breach of a contract to make a
will, that it be fully proved. It
must appear to have been a clear
understanding between the parties,
and deliberately entered into and
understood by-them. It is said in
Fry on Sp. Per., 223, " such contracts are regarded with suspicion,
and will not be sustained except
upon the strongest evidence that
it was founded upon a sufficient
consideration, and was the deliberate act of the deceased:" Drake v.
Lanning, 24 Atlantic, 378:; Newton
v. Newton, 46 Minn., 3?.
But certainty to a common intent will be sufficient, and where a
person makes such representations
as will in law amount to an offer,
which are acted upon by the other
party, a binding contract will be
created: Thompson v. Stevens, 71
Pa. St., 161.
Thus, in Hammersly v. De Biel,
12 Cl. and Fin., 45, the agent of
the father wrote to the gentleman
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who was about to marry his amount." Such a case was Graham
daughter, "The father also intends
v. Graham, 34 Pa. St., 475. The
to leave the sum of Cio,ooo in his deceased, being old, promised his
nieces that if they would five with
will to Miss T. This arrangement
is subject to revision, but-it is suffi- him till he died he would "givethem as much as any relation he
cient for the Baron B. to act upon."
He did act upon it, and the mar- has on earth," without suggesting
riage was solemnized. Held, that what that amount would be. The
the estite of the father was bound mother gave testimony as to the
by the contract: Bold v. Hutchin- conversation with the uncle at the
son, 20 Bev., 250; Jamison v. time the alleged contract was made,
-which tended to prove iti and
Stein, 21 Bev., 5.
:Exactly what proof is necessary
another witness testified -to admisin a particular case is of consider- sions by the deceased of having
able difficulty to state, but the rule made such a contract. They were
is about the same as in any other 'all of a loose and rambling nature,
and the court refused to enforce it,
contract except that the court will
be more particular, and require saying it was.too uncertain. In

Cessna v. Miller, 51 N. W., 5o (Ia.,
X892), the action was to recover a
farm on the ground that the deceased had promised that if plaintiff lived with her and took care of
her she should have it at her death:
Several witnesses testified to'statements by the deceased to the effect
that the plaintiff was to have the
farm. But the court held it insufficient to establish any binding contract. To the same effect are:
Pollock v. Ray, 85 Pa. St., 428;
Walls' App., III Pa., 46o.
But where the evidence reaclies
to the courts, especially since the the degree of certainty required by
proof which is generally produced. the court, or, as has been said,
is of the most-unsatisfactory char- where the evidence is "direct and
acter. "Courts,"
said Justice positive," the necessary relief will
SHARswooD, in Thompson v. Ste- be granted, tor although the strict
vens (ante), " by which the estates rule has been: found expedient in
of deceased persons are called upon
order to protect the estates of deto pay large sums to -nurses and
ceased persons, it will not be perhousekeepers, ought to be very mitted to work an evil upon those
closely scanned, and juries in- who have entered into an honest
structed that they can only be contract with him: Thompson v.
made out on very clear proof. Stevens, 71 Pa. St., 161 ; Cottrell's
Courts are espetially justified in Estate, 2 W. N. C., 237.
setting aside such verdicts when
These cases are only a step renot founded upon proof of this moved from those where the sercharacter, or when unreasonable in vices are rendered simply on the
stronger evidence where it is to

make a will thanin ordinary cases:
McClure v McClure, I Pa. St,, 374;
Mundorf v. Kilbourn, 4 Md., 459.
It has been said." The burden of
proving such a contract and showing its exact terms is upon the
party asserting it:" ii Pa. C.C.,
493Quite a line of cases has arisen
upon contracts that, if the plaintiff
will live with the deceased and care
for him during life, he .shall have
certain property athis death. Such
claims are particularly obnoxious
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hope of reward by will, and without any agreement for compensation at all. Such claims are never
allowed and no recovery can be
had for such gratuitous services:
Osbourne v. Guy's Hospital, 2
Strange, 239; Martin v. Wright,
13 Wend., 46o; Mullin's Estate,
136 Pa. St., 239.
Like all other contracts, an
agreement to make a testamentary
disposition of property must conform to the Statute of Frauds, so
that a contract for the disposition
of land by will, to be enforceable
must be in writing, or must avoid
the statute on the ground of part
performance: Harder v. Harder, 2
Sauf. Ch., i9; Johnson v. Hubble,
5 Am. LAw R G., 177; Brinker v.
Brinker, 7 Barr., 53; Gould v.
Mansfield, io3 Mass., 408; Drake
v. Lanning, 24 AUt. Rep., 378.
But if the contract can be colected from the letters which have
passed between the parties, the
statute will be satisfied: Hammersley v. De Beil, 12 C. & F., 45; Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind., 473.
So, too, the will itself executed
in pursuance of an agreement, may
operate as a writing within the
statute. It is merely a will, however, and revocable during the life
of the maker, unless possession be
taken under it, and the plaintiff
fulfill his part of the agreement, in
which case it amounts to an executed contract, which is irrevocable and may be enforced even during the life of the maker: McCue
v. Johnson, 25 Pa St., 306; 34 Pa.
St., i8o; Tuitt v. Smith, 127 Pa.
St., 341; 137 Pa. St., 35: Brinker v.
Brinker, 7 Pa. St., 53.
The doctrine of part performance
as a method of avoiding the hardships which would be occasioned
by strict enforcement of the Stat-
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ute of Frauds, has been universally
applied to this class of contracts,
but what is a sufficient part performance in a particular cage is a
harder question. As before stated,
the contract must be clearly proved,
and the acts set up to take it out of
the statute must be "'unequivocally
in performance of the contract,"
and referable thereto.: Carlisle v.
Flemming, i Harrington, 421.
In England it has been held that
marriage entered into upon the
promise of the deceased that he
would by will give the plaintiff certain property is not sufficient to
take the case out of the statute.
This was ruled in Caton v. Caton,
L. R., i Ch. App., 137; L. R., 2
H. L. C., 127. Where negotiations
for a settlement were broken off
upon the promise by the deceased
that he would by will give his wife
'all her property. The marriage
was solemnized upon this promise,
but the husband died without having made the will agreed upon.
The court held that the contract
was within the English statute r quiring that a contract upon the
the consideration of marriage must
be in writing, and that the marriage was not sufficient part performance to take the case out of
it, and, therefore, the contract
could not be enforced: Coals v.
Pilkington L. R., '9 Eq., 174.
This decision rests upon the peculiar provisions of the English
statute, which would be rendered
meaningless by any other conclusion.
Generally, in the United
StateS, this clause is not in force,
and the rule would probably be
different were a similar case to
arise.
Where the agreement is that if
the plaintiff will work the farm
during the life of the deceased, it
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shall be given to him at his death,
and relying upon this promise the
plaintiff enters into possession and
cultivates the farm, and expends
money upon it, he will be entitled
to specific performance of the contract, even though it be not in
writing: Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa.
St., 53; Young v. Young, 45 Y- JEq., 27; Smith v. Pierce, 25' Atl.
Rep., 1092 (Vt.).
But the mere expenditure of
money alone will not take the case
out of the statute, unless it be
clearly in pursuance of an express
contract: McClure v. McClure,
i Pa. St., 374.
So if the contract be that if the
plaintiff will live with the promissor for a certain time, and he do
so, the contract will be enforced.
Not only so, but where the contract was made- between the deceased and the parent of an infant
child, the court will enforce it in
favor of the child. Such a case
was Van Duyne v. Vreeland, ii
N. J. Cli., 370; 12 id., 142. The
father of an infant 6hild orally
agreed with its uncle that the child
should live with the uncle during
his life, and that he should receive
all the uncle's property upon the
death of himself and wife. The
child lived with*the uncle twentythree years, and' the uncle having
made a conveyance clearly in fraud
of the agreement the court set it
aside, and granted specific performance of the original contract.
The contract, although parole, was
taken out of the statute by the infant having performed his part of
it.
The same conclusion was
reached in Sharkey v, McDermott,
.9I Mo., 647; Van Tine v. Van
-Tine, 13 Central Rep., 354.
Directly opposed to these is the
decision in Austin v. Davis, 128
Ind., 473, decided in 189i. An in-
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fant was adopted by a man, with
his wife's consent, in pursuance of
a contract so to do, and to leave
her all his estate at his death.
The deceased made a'bona fide
conveyance of all his property to
his wife, afid shortly after died.
The wife refiewed the promise by
parole, but died without making
any such disposition. Held, the
contract was within the Statute of
Frauds, and although the infant
had lived with the deceased according to the agreement, it constituted
no such part performance as would
avoid the statute. The decision,
however, is confessedly upon the
former cases in the same State,
and no outside authorities are cited
to support it, so it can hardly be
considered as affecting the general
rule, especially as the doctrine of
part performance is, as a whole,
recognized.
Where two parties agree to make
mutual wills, and one .dies without
either will having been revoked,
or the contract having been discharged, the other party will not
be permitted to make a different
disposition of his property from
that agreed upon. Williams on
Ex. (6 Am. Ed.), 12 and 13, 162-3.
In such a case, where, after the
death of one of the contracting
parties the othei made a different
will, Lord CAMDEN, in giving relief
to the injured Parties, madeuse of
the followifg language, which
would seem to express the true
reason of the rule: "It is a contract between the partieis, which
cannot be rescinded, but by the
consent of both. The first that
dies carries his part of the contract
into execution. Will the court
afterward permit the other to break
thecontract? Certainlynot." Dufour v. Pereira, i Dick., 419.
A similar case arose in Lord Wal-

OF PROPERTY
pole v. Lord Orford, 3 Vesy Jr.,
402, and the relief prayed was denied because of the general uncertainty of the case, and not from
any objection to the theory.
So in Carmichael v. Carmichael,
72 Mich., 76, the agreement to
make mutual wills was parole between husband and wife, and the
husband'died leaving a will made
in pursuance of the contract. The
wife, having accepted the provisions of the husband's will, was
restrained from doing any act
whereby it would be impossible for
her to carry out her part of the agreement, upon the express grounds
that "Having accepted the terms
of the husband's will, the contract
was sufficiently part performed to
be taken out of the statute of
frauds." But the mere making of
a will in pursuance of such a contract will not be sufficient part performance to prevent a revocation
by either party during their joint
lives: Gould v. Mansfield, io3
Mass., 408.
Consideration.- Like all other
enforceable contracts, whether or
not within the Statute of Frauds, a
contract to make a will must be on
a sufficient consideration, either by
way of advantage to the one party
or detriment to the other: Drake
v. Lanning, 24 At., 378; McClure
v. McClure, I Pa. St., 374; King's
Estate (principal case).
Any valuable consideration will
be sufficient, and this will include
marriage: Robinson v. Ommannly,
L. R., 21 Ch. D., 78, C. A., 23 Ch.
D., 285; Johnson v. Hubble, 5 AM.
LAW RIUG., 177; Caton v. Caton,
L. R., i Ch. App., 137So services rendered, or to be
rendered will be sufficient: Snyder
v. Castor, 4 Yeats, 353.
And in the case of an agreement
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to make mutual wills, the reciprocal
promises will be sufficient: Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich.,
76.
In short, the rule laid down by%
Lord COTTONHAM in Hammersly v.
De Beil (ante),would seem satisfactory. It is: "A representation made
by one party, for the purpose of
influencing the conduct of the other
party, and acted on by him, will
in general be sufficient to entitle
him to the assistance of this court
.for the purpose of realizing such
representations:" Coals v. Pilkington, L. R., i9 Eq., 174.
In Ridley v. Ridley, i i Jur. N. S.,
475, the plaintiffs sold land to "A,"
who was the partner of the deceased, upon the promise of deceased that he would give the
plaintiffs the value of the land in
his will. This he failed to do, and
Sir JOHN RoirI, y held, that since
the contract was clearly proved,
and it appeared that for various
reasons the deceased was anxious
to have the sale made, that the
consideration was sufficient, and
the contract would be enforced.
So in Van Duyne v. Vreeland
(ante), a child having gone to live
with an uncle upon the understanding that he was to receive the
uncle's property at his death, the
giving up of his interest in his own
father's estate was held to be a sufficient consideration to support the
promise: Hedley v. Simpson, 20
S. W., 881.
A much stricter rule, however,
was laid down by the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey in Drake
v. Lanning, 24 Atl., 378. The contract was that if the plaintiff would
continue to live upon the farm, and
find a purchaser for a first mortgage there was upon it, the deceased
would, by her will, release a second
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mortgage, which she held, and
also provide funds to pay the said
first mortgage. The plaintiff accordingly fulfilled her part of the
&contract,but the deceased failed to
make the proper will. The court
decreed that since the agreement
was all to the advantage of the
plaintiff, and for her benefit, there
could be no recovery. Although
the decision is a harsh one, it could
probably be explained by the circumstances of the particular case,
were it not that the court expressly
differs from Loffus v. Maw, 8 Jur.,
N. S., 607, and Coals sr. Pilkington
(ante), both. of which follow Lord
CoToNAM's rule, and would seem
like extremely fair decisions. In
the latter the deceased promised
that if the plaintiff would give up
her prospect of going into the
millinery business, she should have
her house during life in which to
take boarders. *This she did, and
occupied the house till the death of
the promissor. Vice Chancellor
Malins decreed that she should
have the house during her life
according to the contract. Although
the Vice Chancellor "has the misfortune to be frequently overruled,"
the decision would seem like a
sound one, following closely as it
ddes, the earlier cases; and the
rule established would seem to be
more reasonable than that of the
New Jersey Court.
Effect Upon the Promissor.-The
effect of such an obligation upon
the person making it, has given
iise to some interesting discussion. If the contract is to be enforced upon the death of the promissor, shall it not bind him during his life so that he shall not do
any act whereby the performance
of the agreement on his death shall
be rendered impossible? The ques-

tion has seldom arisen, but where
the contract is intended to bind
the present property of the parties,
or to effect their immediate actions, it will generally be enforced:
Lewis v. Maddocks, 8 Vesy, 156.
So the court will grant an injunction to restrain the offending
party from doing acts which would
render the performance of the contract impossible when the proper
time arrives, and will set aside,
as fraudulent, conveyances which
would have that effect: Austin v.
Davis, 128 Ind., 473; Bird v. Pope,
73 Mich., 483.
(The cases under this head have
been more fully noted in other
parts of this note.)
The effect -of a covenant to make
a will in a particular manner waq
before- the court in Needham v.
Kirkman, 3 B. &Ald., 531. "A"
covenanted with the trustees of a
settlement he had -just made, that
he would, by will or otherwise,
"give and devise all other his real
estate and personal estate to, and
among, his children, etc." Subsequently, having made an agreement to sell certain of his land,
objection was made to the title on
account of the covenant. Held,
that it applied only to the real
estate of which he died possessed.
Affirmed in Needham v. Smith, 4
Russ, 318.
In a case of the kind, however,
although the promissor is only
bound to dispose of that which he
possesses at his death, and retains
full control of the property during
his life, he will not be permitted to
make a contrary disposition in its
effect testamentary, or which will
be in fraud of those entitled under
the agreement: Fortescue v. Hannab, i9 Vesy, 67; Randall v. Wills,
5 Vesy, 262; VanDuyne v. Vree-

OF PROPERTY
land, ii N. J. Ch., 370; 12 id., 142;
Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind., 473.
But where a person covenants to
let an existing will remain, and
subsequently marries, although
the marriage will firo tanto revoke
the will, and so cause a breach of
contract, it is said that no action
will lie: Pollock on Contracts, 308.
Remedy for Breach.-The remedy in case of the breach of a contract to make a will, of course
varies with the relief sought. At
law the action is simply for the
damage occasioned by the breach,
or, perhaps, in a proper case, an
action would lie for the specific recovery of the property promised:
Newton v. Newton, 46 Minn., 33The important question at law,
therefore, is the measure of damages. In equity the courts have
endeavored fairly to adjust the
rights of the parties, and suit the
relief to the particular case. It
was said by Justice ROGERS, in
Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa. St., 27,
where the agreement was in writing: "Had the will not been made,
equity would, no doubt, decree a
conveyance, and a jury would give
damages to the amount of the
value of the land." This is, no
doubt, true, where the contract is
completely made out, and specific
performance will be decreed of a
contract to make a will where the
intervening equities do not prevent
it, and in those cases the parties
will be put in as nearly the position they before occupied as possible: Parsons on Contracts, 563
(n); Waterman on Sp. Per., 41;
Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq., 27;
Sharkey v. McDermott, 91, No.
647.
In Johnson v. Hubble, 5 AM1.
LAw RUG., a young man having
conveyed to his sister certain land,
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in pursuance of a contract with the
father, that upon his death he
would make an equal distribution
of his property betwen the brother
and sister, which he failed to do,
but gave it all to the sister, the
court held that although specific
performance could not be decreed
because the sister wa9 not a party
to the contract, yet she would be
compelled to reconvey the land
which the brother had conveyed to
her as a consideration for the
promise with the father. So in
Lisle v. Tribble, 17 S. W., 742
(Ky.), where a note had been given
to the promissor, on the agreement
that he would, by will, give the
plaintiff its value in land. This he
failed to do, and recovery was allowed upon the note on the ground
that the consideration for the gift
of it had utterly failed: De Moss
v. Robinson, 46 Mich., 62.
Where the covenant simply is to
give a certain amount of money or
property, or an amount which may
be rendered certain, the court will
allow a recovery for such an
amount: Mayd v. Field, L. R., 3
Ch., 587; Thacker v. Key, L. R., 8
Eq., 4o8; Thompson v. Stevens, 71
Pa. St., 161; Cottrell's Estate, 2W.
N. C., 237.
So where the contract was to give
an amount equal to what he should
give to his younger children, the
trustees of the settlement were entitled to recover an amount sufficient to make the share equal, having respect to advancementsalready
made: Wells v. Black, 4 Russ.,
170.
So where the promise is to
compensate for services rendered,
or to be rendered, by a provision
in the will, or by a definite portion of the estate of the de
ceased, it would appear that the
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injured party, in addition to his
action for specific performance,
where that is possible, would be
entitled to recover on a quantum
ineruitfor the reasonable worth of
hisservices: Patterson v. Patterson,
13 Johns., 379; Hudson v.-Hudson,
13 S. E., 583 (Ga.).
Indeid, this form of action would
seem to be the most favored, as the
courts will require very clear proof
of a contract to give a distributive
share of the estate, and in Pennsylvania would almost seem to doubt
the right to recover it at all: Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. St., 475;
Pollock v. Ray, 85 'Pa. St., 428;
Wall's App., III Pa. St., 46o;
Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St.,
16r.
If the will be made in accordance
with the agreement, there can be
nothing more required:
In re
Brookman's Trust, L. R.. 5 Ch.
App., 183.
So where a son remained with his
father, under the expectation that
he would be compensated by will,
but leaving the amount aiscretionary with the father, it was 'held in
analogy to ordinary contracts of
hiriig that he must be satisfied
with any provision which may be
made, whether it be what was expecteo or not: Lee's App., 53
Conn., 363; Eaton v. Benton, 2
Hill, 578.
Owing to the peculiar wording of
our Statute of Frauds, although the
land itself cannot be recovered
upon a parole contract, there is
nothing to prevent an action of
damages for the bieach. The only

question was as to the measure of
damages. In the early cases where
the contract was oral to give land
by will in payment forservices, the
court distinguished between a contract for the sale of land, and a
contract to coimpensate for services
in land, and made the measure of
damages in the latter case the value
of the land at the time it should
have been given, or at the death of
the promissor: Bash v'. Bash, 9 Pa.
St., 263; Jack v. McKee, 9 Pa. St.,
235; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7
Cowen, 92.
But it was soon seen that this was
in effect allowing a recovery of laud
upon a parole contract. This was
shown in the dissenting opinion of
Justice WOODWARD, in Melaun's
Ad. v. Amnon, I Grant, 123, and
when four years later -Iertzog r,.
Hertzog, 34 Pa., 475, was argued,
the fersonnel of the court having
much changed, the old rule was
abandoned, and the new.one of Justice WOODWARD adopted.
It is
expressed thus: "A man who contracts for land, and pays the price,
but loses it without fraud of the
vendor, can at most ouly recover
back his money, or the value of his
services rendered, if this is the form
in which the consideration was
paid." The same change has gone
on in the other States, so that now
the value of the land has no place
in fixing the damages, and an action
only lies for a recovery of the consideration paid: Wallace v. Long,
IO5 Ind., 522; Reed on Statute of
Frauds, 11, 728.
C. WILFRED CONARD.

